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GENERAL

1. Soviet ambassador fears adoption of EDC:

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In a recent conversation in Paris with Soviet ambassador Vinogradov, the French ambassador to Moscow obtained the impression that Vinogradov, in con-

trast to his position last summer, appeared to fear that EDC would be adopted.

Vinogradov repeated his earlier views that the Soviet Union and France had a common interest in preventing German remilitarization, that EDC ratification is not in the best interest of France, and that the two nations should consequently exchange views on the German problem.

Comment: On 8 August Malenkov made a pointed reference to the Franco-Soviet pact as a basis for European security, an idea reintroduced in the Soviet note of 3 November. Soviet propaganda has similarly attempted to capitalize on French reluctance to accept German rearmament in any form.


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SOVIET UNION



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3. Soviet anti-American propaganda stepped up:

Ambassador Bohlen has noted a revival of Soviet "hate-America" propaganda and a sharpened anti-American tone in current output.

He points out that propaganda since Stalin's death has been primarily of a general nature, drawing the usual Marxist distinction between conditions in a Communist state and those in the outside world where workers and colonial peoples are subject to capitalist exploitation.

In Bohlen's opinion, however, the more specific type of propaganda directed toward developing hate and fear of a particular country, which was prevalent in Stalin's last years, has been making a comeback during the past two months, although it is still not predominant and still far below that of the Stalinist period. He believes that propaganda of this type comes to the fore in periods when Soviet leaders are unwilling even to enter negotiations.

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### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### 5. Chinese Nationalists hint at pressure on US:

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The American embassy in Taipei has been shown portions of a message, purportedly sent to General Li Mi by subordinates still at Mong Hsat in Burma, protesting American support of the Burmese. According to a Chinese Nationalist Foreign Ministry official, the message also contained a paragraph asserting that, in the event of continued American pressure endangering the existence of Nationalist forces in Burma, they would "make known to the world the relations which once existed between our troops and the United States and let the world pass fair judgment."

Comment: The message may be genuine, but might also have been invented or elaborated in Taipei. Nationalist officials in either place might well believe that such a threat would induce the United States to relax its pressure for evacuation of Li Mi's forces.

#### 6. Indonesian Communists exploiting United States tin policies:


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American tin purchases are assuming primary political importance in Indonesia and have been seized on by the

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Communists as an issue on which to attack American policy, according to Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta. The Communists are encouraging the belief that the United States will buy tin only to the extent that Indonesia is willing to make political concessions.

The ambassador comments that the Indonesians have not forgotten the government crisis of 1952 over the question of American aid, which many of them considered was being used as an instrument of political policy. He emphasized that falling markets for Indonesian tin and other products might well lead to further social unrest which the Communists could exploit.

Comment: The United States is about to negotiate the third annual purchase of approximately 20,000 tons of tin under terms of a contract signed in March 1952. The Communists apparently are trying to make it appear that the anticipated decrease in price, which is subject to negotiation in the third year of the contract, represents an effort to exact political concessions.

7. Indonesian government party ordered to cooperate with Communists:

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The American embassy in Djakarta confirms a report that the chairman of Indonesia's National Party, the major element in the present government, recently stated that he had instructed the party's branches throughout the country to "establish good connections" and cooperate with the Communists. He said that since the Communists were supporting the government in parliament, such instructions were completely logical.

Comment: Relations between the National Party and the Communists have become very close during the past six months,


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Through cooperation, the Communists have achieved a major voice in Indonesian affairs while escaping the responsibilities of cabinet office.

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8. Burmese report Soviet commercial offer:

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
Kyaw Nyein, Burmese minister of industry, told Ambassador Sebald that the Soviet Union had offered on 30 October to provide vehicles, medicines, building material and industrial equipment in exchange for rice, lead and beans. He stated that the prime minister had issued instructions to prepare for negotiations.

On the other hand, Kyaw Nyein expressed the fear that his country was entering a Soviet trap and was concerned that any trade agreement would lead to an influx of Soviet technicians. He also indicated that an early American decision to provide Burma with military equipment would do much to strengthen its anti-Communist orientation.

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Comment:



It is probable that Kyaw Nyein's remarks were made primarily in an effort to obtain American arms and to get help in disposing of the current rice surplus.

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**EASTERN EUROPE****12. Comment on probable new government in Finland:**

A coalition of the Social Democratic and right-of-center parties is expected to succeed Premier Kekkonen's Agrarian-controlled minority government which resigned on 4 November. Such a government, with a working majority of 106 out of 200 parliamentary seats, would be stronger than its predecessor and be assured of the support of a large share of labor as well as business interests. Its ability to agree on measures to solve Finland's economic problems will be limited, however, by the wide disparity of views on economic issues held by the members of the proposed coalition.

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The Soviet Union has indicated its displeasure at the prospect that strongly pro-Western elements will be included in the cabinet by bitter press attacks on representatives of the Social Democratic and conservative parties. Since Soviet-Finnish trade negotiations are currently under way in Moscow, the USSR could further manifest its disapproval by engaging in dilatory tactics and attempting to force less favorable terms on the Finns. [REDACTED]

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